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REVIEWS 
OPTIONS ON THE BERLIN PRuBLEM: A REVIEW ARTICLE* 
STEPHEN R. BOWERS 
Few post-War European disputes have received greater long-term 
attention that the question of the division of Berlin. During 
numerous crises, Berlin has been regarded as the greatest existing 
threat to peace and during the era of detente it has been touted as a 
barometer of East-West relations. There has always been 
considerable rhetoric about the need to "resolve" the Berlin problem 
or, as Khrushchev said, to "normalise" the Berlin situation. The 1971 
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has been seen by many as an 
important step in the long approach to a solution. The contributions 
of this agreement are carefull examined by Honore M. Catudal, Jr. 
in A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (Berlin: 
Berlin Verlag, 1978). Although the scope of Catudal's study is 
narrow, his examination does help the reader chart the evolution of 
the Berlin situation in terms of several scenarios for possible 
resolution of this problem. 
There are three basic matters relating to the implementation of 
the Quadripartite Agreement examined in this book. First is the 
question of transportation between West Berlin and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Four charters, tho'se related to access controls, 
rail transport, waterways, and air traffic, are devoted to this. The 
second topic is personal concerns such as private communications 
and living conditions and is covered in two chapters, one dealing with 
freedom of movement between East and West Berlin and the other 
with resolution of such urban problems as sewage disposal. Finally, 
in three chapters the study examines a number of legal and political 
questions ranging from consular representation of West Berlin to th~ 
role of the West Berlin question in major foreign policies. The 
interesting text of the book is supplemented by a 150 page section of 
appendices including a chronology of events from 1943 to 1978, 
official texts of various statements on Berlin, and ten tables of data-
on trade and traffic of Berlin. 
In order to consider where Berlin is today, it is useful to analyse 
the full ntnge of possible options for resolution of the question of 
*A review of Honore M. Catudal, Jr. A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978) 
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the status of the city. From the East German viewpoint, the most 
desirable solution is total incorporation of West Berlin into the GDR. 
The tangible benefits are obvious: the territory and people 'of West 
Berlin would be added to the CDR. The psychological gains are even 
more impressive. First, there would be a considerable increase in East 
German prestige as its capital city becomes the largest in both 
Germanies. Second, this enhanced prestige would do much to dispel 
notions of the GDR as a "rump" nation created from a fragment of 
the once enormous unified Germany. Elimination of West Berlin as a 
"Pan-Germanic symbol" constitutes still another value of this option. 
It is also easy to see the political gain accruing to the SED regime as 
the hated Berlin Wall is removed. The significance of such an action 
would be felt not only by Berliners and Germans, but also by the 
many foreign VIsItors who have viewed the Wall. A fifth 
psychological advantage comes with the elimination of what Erich 
Honecker has described as a "thorn in the flesh of the GDR .. : ." 
For years SED leaders have expressed concern about the use of West 
Berlin by escape organisations, espionage services, and 
non-Communist radio a'nd television stations. With total 
incorporation, such a situation would no longer exist. Finally, the 
SED regime would benefit from this option by ending its continuing 
dependency on the USSR as its representative in Four-Power 
.negotiations on Berlin. . 
There is, however, one possible loss for the SED associated with 
this resolution. Many observers have commented ·that the SED has 
grown accustomed to tension since its creation and still needs a 
degree of tension to compensate for the absence of a durable sense of 
national identity. West Berlin;s presence has provided the leadership 
its best opportunity for occasional confrontation with the West as a 
means of stressing that "enemies" were in their midst. The SED has 
been able to create a sense of .tension by expressing alarm at West 
Berlin-based spies, agents, and provocateurs. Without West Berlin as a 
"thorn in the flesh", the SED might be deprived of a useful unifying 
element. 
The fundamental problem of this option is its feasibility. A 
diminished Western interest in West Berlin is required for fulfillment 
of this scenario, either disinterest permitting a sudden Eastern 
military move on West Berlin or one promoting a Western trade-off 
of West Berlin for some corresponding Eastern concession elsewhere. 
Catudal's study provides firm evidence that no such loss of Western 
interest has yet occurred. He notes, for example, the Allied insistence 
in 1975 that the Senate of West Berlin reject an East German legal 
formulation declaring the Berlin Wall a "state frontier" in the middle 
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of Berlin because acceptance would have implied reduced Western 
responsibility for Berlin. (pp.l02~103) 
Another possible scenario for resolution of this problem is 
incorporation of West Berlin into the GDR by a territorial exchange. 
It is not inconceivable that the GDR might agree to yield some of its 
territory in, order to acquire West Berlin. A population transfer 
would be necessary to avoid the sort of incidents associated with . 
construction of the Berlin Wall and the securing of the East-West 
German frontier in the GDR's early years. Such an exchange would 
be characterised by orderliness and bi-Iateral negotiations between 
East and West Germany. A most cordial East-West atmosphere 
would be a pre-condition for such an exchange and the four 
occupying powers would have to agree to surrender their rights in 
Berlin. . 
The principal advantages of this plan over the previous one are, 
first, that no East-West confrontation is required and, second, that 
this proposal serves the interests of the current policies of detente. 
These factors greatly increase the feasibility of this alternative. All 
the gains which the GDR would have enjoyed under the previous 
option are p-reserVed in this plan with two exceptions. First, East 
Germany would not gain the West Berlin population and, second, 
since an orderly population transfer is envisaged, it is reasonable to 
conclude that much of the material wealth of the city, including 
industrial installations, would be removed. However, the primary 
disadvantage is that the FRG would have to be recognised as the 
power with the right to act on the disposition of the West Berlin 
issue. As Catudal's study on the Quadripartite Agreement indicates, 
there would be a reluctance on the part of the USSR and the GDR to 
accept such a proposition. 
A Communist controlled West Berlin is a third scenario for 
resolution of the Berlin problem. With this option West Berlin' 
continues to exist as an essentially separate city with its own 
government. Control would be exercised through the Socialist Unity 
Party of West Berlin (SEW), the West Berlin branch of the GDR's 
SED. Allied rights in Berlin would become a special concern since a 
continuation of four-power duties would probably be opposed by 
the dominant West Berlin political forces. 
How could the ·SEW gain control of West Berlin? Political and. 
economic turmoil would be necessary to produce a favourable 
climate. Should the West suffer a serious economic depression, West 
Berlin would be affected and the SEW might, as a result, take control 
through the electoral process. The SEW would certainly be able to 
count on substantial support from the GDR and the latter could even 
Options on The Berlin Problem: A Review Article 115 
. attempt to subvert the political process to aid the SEW. The GDR 
and the USSR might promise the city that it would enjoy special 
benefits as a result of showing its "political maturity" and electing 
the SEW. The prospect of removal of the Berlin Wall or the 
institution of other improvements in West Berlin's status might be 
raised as incentives to vote for the SEW. Catudal demonstrates the 
desire of the West Berlin Senate for local improvements and his 
account of such progress in overcoming the rupture of East and West 
Berlin does reveal the prospects for a gradual incorporation of West 
Berlin into the CDR. The latter point is significant because there 
would be a serious question regarding the permanence of a separate 
SEW· controlled West Berlin. 
The advantages of this scenario over the previous ones are that 
it involves no serious· East-West confrontation, it requires no 
territorial exchanges, nor does it demand recognition of the FRG as 
the custodian of West Berlin's interests. The GDR still enjoys the 
benefits of an increase in its real estate, enhanced prestige and 
stability, and the removal of the "thorn in its flesh". Removal of the 
Wall would also be possible once "hostile elements" in West Berlin 
were subdued. 
Failing to gain full political control of the city, the GDR and 
the USSR might be content with a "Finlandised" West Berlin. This 
resolution requires neither a social nor a political transformation of 
West Berlin. In this variation, West Berlin's relations with the East are 
cordial and its trade with East Germany is of special importance. 
Four·Power control and Western troops have been eliminated and 
West Berlin is regarded as a sovereign political entity. 
However, in spite of West Berlin's independence and neutrality, 
it is subject to Communist intervention in its internal affairs. Soviet 
insistence on special procedures for invitations to international 
congresses and contents held in West Berlin, a matter discussed by 
Catudal, might be viewed as one current manifestation of this 
tendency. Soviet-led boycotts of Eastern participation in West 
Berlin·based events have been a convenient device when the city'S 
Senate has refused to yield to pressures (pp.114-116). With West 
Berlin a thoroughly "Finlandised" entity, the instruments of 
coercion would become more powerful. Vital trade and economic 
agreements could be jeopardised, East German representatives in 
West Berlin could be re·called, or military actions could even be 
mentioned if the issue seemed serious enough. The objective 0.£ such 
measures would not be a physical takeover, but merely the 
correction of offending policies or conditions in West Berlin. Good 
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relations, of course, could be rewarded by a number of positive 
actions by the GDR and its allies. 
The principal advantage of this arrangement, from the East 
German viewpoint, is that West Berlin would cease to be an irritant 
and West Germany's presence in the city, the most disputed aspect of 
the implementation of the Berlin agreement, according to Catudal 
(p.123), could be completely eliminated. A "Finlandised" West 
Berlin might emerge as a result of continued East-West detente 
combined with Allied neglect of West Berlin. No upheavals in West 
Berlin or GDR-Soviet pressures are required. In fact, Communist 
benignity would do more to advance this development since it would 
foster the belief that West Berlin could co-exist peacefully with its 
neighbours .. The six years of successful implementation of the 
Quadripartite Agreement discussed by Catudal might constitute a 
significant contribution to the encouragement of such a belief. 
Less advantageous to the GDR is the possible solution of this 
problem by establishing West Berlin as a "free city" under United 
Nations sponsorship. This alternative would involve an 
internationally sponsored effort to perpetuate what is essentially the 
status quo. The Four-Power status of Berlin would be terminated by 
the establishment of a UN protectorate and transit rights would be 
guaranteed by the UN. Such an arrangement could come about as a 
product of detente and Western efforts to provide a stable 
foundation for West Berlin's independence. 
As with the previous scenario, East Germany would no longer 
be dependent on the USSR as sole protector of its interests regarding 
West Berlin. The basic problem of West Berlin is not removed by this 
development, but it is at least out of the hands of the East Germans, 
the Soviets, and the Western powers. In the UN the Soviet-led bloc 
would have to act jointly to advance the GDR's interests, thus the 
SED regime would remain dependent on the USSR for support in the 
,General Assembly and the Security Council. However, the USSR 
alone would not be able to guarantee protection of East German 
positions. Therefore, the GDR's dependence would be diluted as 
appeals must be made to a variety of groups to secure support. 
Overall, the GDR's independence would be increased by 
implementation of this pr,ogramme. Moreover, removal of Western 
troops from West Berlin would, by itself, be a victory for East 
Germany. In addition, the East Germans profit here by not having to 
recognise a special FRG-West Berlin relationship. UN sponsorship, 
to a great degree, would internationalise the Berlin question. Of 
course, there is also a negative side to this option for the GDR since 
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the SED would be deprived of the material gains offered by total 
incorporation and UN supervision would make future unilateral 
Communist moves against West Berlin more difficult. The same 
'would also be true of Western moves regarding West Berlin. From 
Catudal's account, it appears likely that the West, however, would 
welcome such a solution as a means of reducing its 'already 
considerable burdens. The East, which, according to Catudal, is 
intent on severing West Berlin's ties with the FRG (pp.133-134) 
might view this as a device for firmly establishing the fact of West 
Berlin's complete separation from West Germany. 
Still less favourable for the GDR is the prospect of West Berlin 
as a part of an East-West German confederation. This would bring 
re-amalgamation of Berlin by re-unification of both Germanies in a 
genuine confederation. Straight population would be the most 
appropriate formula for apportioning seats in an all-German 
legislature but this approach would reduce the political forces of the 
GDR to permanent minority status. 
The effect of this option on GDR-Soviet relations would be 
revolutionary since the GDR would cease to exist as a separate 
entity. The principal concern would now be all-German-Soviet 
relations. 
The only advantage of this plan for the East Germans is that 
they would have a chance to win control of both West Berlin and 
West Germany by becoming the dominant force in the 
confederation. Their dominance would produce a Communist 
Germany that could possibly be very independent of the USSR. This 
independence would be a function of the fact that, first, power, if 
legally attained, would likely have come without major Soviet 
assistance and, second, the united Germany would be considerably 
stronger economically and politically. However, the prospects for an 
SED victory would not be good thus raising the very real possibility 
that the SED would lose everything. This near certainty is enough to 
prevent serious East German or Soviet consideration of a 
confederation. 
The final scenario, almost totally opposite from the first, is the 
establishment of West Berlin as a Land of the FRG. As Catudal's 
description of the status quo demonstrates, West Berlin is a long way 
from this. Realisation of this option would require that West Berlin 
have voting representatives in the West German legislature and that 
the FRG acquire extraterritorial rights on at least one corridor.from 
Berlin to the FRG. The West German military would also have to be 
introduced into West Berlin and, with the necessary termination of 
. Four-Power control,.Allied troops would leave West Berlin. 
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This would be unlikely during an era of detente. It requires a 
complete reversal of the Western policy outlined by Catudal and, 
simultaneously, a considerable weakening of the USSR's 
international position. The creation of an FRG Land in West Berlin 
would have an immediate deleterious effect on GDR-Soviet 
relations. The SED would view this as a failure by the USSR to 
protect vital East German interests and might feel impelled to pursue 
its interests independently. However, a weak USSR, feeling Western 
pressure, would see any deviations from its policy line as 
unaffordable luxuries. The GDR, meanwhile, would suffer a 
tremendous psychological defeat and tohe permanence of the GDR 
would be placed in serious doubt as the Pan-Germanic role of West 
Berlin is re-emphasised. The domestic restiveness in the GDR noted 
by Catudal (pp.136-137) might become even more serious. 
There is, however, another possibility concerning this option. 
Should West Berlin become a Land of a "Finlandised" West 
Germany, the impact on the GDR and the implementation 
requirements would be different. First, union with a neutral FRG 
would be possible during the current detente and would not require 
Eastern weakness. Second, under these circumstances there need not 
be a deterioration of West German-Soviet relations. The USSR 
could present this action as part of a long-term programme for 
advancement of East German interests and a prelude to creation of a 
re-unified Communist Germany. 
The above scenarios are not a concern of A Balance Sheet of the 
QJtadripartite Agreement on Berlin. They should, however, help 
illuminate 'the developments which Catudal does discuss as they 
relate to the overall progression of the Berlin question toward a 
future resolution. At the same time, a careful reading of Catudal's 
excellent study provides a useful framework for understanding the 
contemporary disposition of what continues to be one of the 
significant post-World War Two issues. 
